Taking  a Walk on a Winter\u27s Night by Brookshire, James E.
Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law 
Volume 9 
Issue 1 Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law, Volume 9, Issue 1 
Article 5 
January 1993 
"Taking" a Walk on a Winter's Night 
James E. Brookshire 
United States Department of Justice 
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Brookshire, James E. (1993) ""Taking" a Walk on a Winter's Night," Journal of Natural Resources & 
Environmental Law: Vol. 9 : Iss. 1 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/jnrel/vol9/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Journal of Natural Resources & Environmental Law by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For 
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu. 




Over the past few years, the concept of regulatory takings has
gained national visibility, captured the attention of an impressive
array of legal scholars, and spawned a number of analytical
"tests." In addition to the concept of physical taking liability,' the
Supreme Court has advanced regulatory theories under Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission,' Penn Central Transportation
Co. v. New York City,' and, more recently, Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.' The most frequent outcome is a conclusion
that the government action has negligible or minimal impact or, if
it imposes a burden, asks of the owner only that which is reasona-
ble. Still, in the facts of a few cases, the courts have found liabil-
ity, concluding that the government action "took" the owner's
property expectations under the terms of the Fifth Amendment."
The first analytical framework suggests that a taking may oc-
cur if-at least when government action compels the physical
* The materials here were assembled during what has become known on the East
Coast as the "Blizzard of '93." Mr. Brookshire expresses his appreciation to Marc Smith,
Dorothy Burakreis, and Susan Cook for their thoughtful comments on this article. The
structure and contents of this article express the author's own views and in no way
represent the views of the United States Department of Justice.
** Deputy Chief, GENERAL LITIGATION SECTION, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RE-
SOURCES DIVISION, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE; J.D., 1976, University of South Car-
olina; B.A., 1973, University of North Carolina, Raleigh.
' See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982)
(holding that a statute requiring landlords to permit cable installation in their buildings
constituted a taking under the traditional physical occupation test); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (holding that low and frequent flights of aircraft over private
land constituted a physical taking).
- 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
' 438 U.S. 104, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 104 (1978).
4 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
' The Takings Clause states "nor shall private property be taken for public use, with-
out just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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presence of others on private property-the particular action does
not "substantially advance the legitimate state interests" argued
to sustain it.' The second framework does not speak in terms of a
bright line but, instead, presumes a balancing of three fac-
tors-the character of the government action, its economic impact
on the property, and the extent to which it interferes with distinct,
investment-backed expectations.' The third "categorical" taking
speaks to the relatively rare circumstance where the government
regulatory action results in a loss of all economically productive or
beneficial use.8 Additionally, the taking challenge may be
mounted against legislation itself (the so-called "facial" challenge
where it is alleged that "mere enactment" of the provisions crosses
the compensability threshold) or against the provisions as they are
applied ("as applied" challenge) to a particular property.9
The struggle to grasp the analytical frameworks that the Su-
preme Court has defined as a question of "fairness and justice"" °
is daunting. In a current landscape of decidedly ad hoc decision
making, the facts of the case are frequently dispositive. Each path
is challenging. One is reminded of cold nighttime walks through a
moonlighted winter forest. The landmarks for the trip are hard to
find-so hard, in fact, that the eye and mind grasp any distin-
guishing movement in the brush, any tree or stone, or looking
upwards, any star as a point of reference for future bearings.
Working with takings "tests" is like that scenario.
Our purpose here is to highlight the emerging points of refer-
ence. It is too early to tell if these recent decisions are enduring
guidemarks-too soon to know if they are the morning stars which
I See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35. "We have long recognized that land-use regulation
does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests' and does
not 'den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' " Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v.
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980)).
1 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. "The economic impact of the regulation on the
claimant and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the char-
acter of the governmental action." Id.
See infra text accompanying notes 11-24.
See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987). "The
posture of the case is critical because we have recognized an important distinction between
a claim that the mere enactment of a statute constitutes a taking and a claim that the
particular impact of government action on a specific piece of property requires the payment
of just compensation." Id. at 494.
1 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (explaining that the Fifth




will guide us to dawn. In any event, we can be certain that as we
move through the takings forest and as the nighttime sky turns
above us, still other, fact-intensive decisions will soon find their
own place in the sky. For the moment, however, we must use what
is currently there. And so, we begin the trek.
I. "TAKING" A WALK THROUGH A NIGHTTIME WINTER
FOREST
As our first landmark, we see the Supreme Court's most re-
cent guidance on the topic of regulatory land use takings.
A. Categorical Taking and Compensable Expectancies
In 1986, David Lucas purchased two residential beachfront
lots on the Isle of Palms, a South Carolina barrier island, for
$975,000.1" At that time, the State's definition of "critical area"2
for protection of its barrier islands extended no further than the
dune on the seaward side of Lucas' tracts.' 3 In 1988, that defini-
tion changed. The State enacted its Beachfront Management Act
(the Act), which precluded occupiable improvements seaward of a
line drawn twenty feet landward of the "baseline."' 4 What was
significant for Lucas and his plans for building on the two lots
(one for speculation and one for occupancy) was that the new
"baseline" was located landward of his lots, precluding his
planned development.'5 Two years later, in 1990, South Carolina
would amend the statute to allow for a variance mechanism.' 6
After succeeding in persuading the state trial court that the
1988 statute deprived him of all economic value in the lots, Lucas
found the South Carolina Supreme Court less hospitable. Given
the Act's legislative findings of "serious public harm" arising from
beach development and the fact that Lucas did not challenge the
validity of those findings in the trial court, the State's high court
found a controlling line of cases which included Mugler v. Kan-
" See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2889 (1992).
12 Beach owners within a "critical area" were required to obtain a permit prior to a
use change. Id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-130A (Law. Co-op. 1987).
Lucas, 112 . Ct. at 2889.
" S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-10 to -220 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1988).
, Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
" Id. at 2890-91 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(D)(1) (Law Co-op. Supp.
1991)).
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sas.17 That line of authority is popularly recognized in takings law
as reflecting the so-called "nuisance exception" to takings liability
for harmful or noxious use.18
The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 19 The case presented
the question of the extent of the government's obligation to com-
pensate where a loss of all economic value occurred and, in that
context, the balancing of societal and private expectations embod-
ied in actions undertaken out of nuisance concerns. How the
Court addressed these concerns has great significance and, for
that reason, the case warrants our attention.
1. Categorical Taking
The Court began by stating a premise of categorical liability
in a discrete and rare set of regulatory taking cases. To be precise,
this "categorical" liability exists "when the owner of real property
has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses
in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property
economically idle . . "'o Without something more, legislative
statements "of a noxious-use justification [could not] be the basis
for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory tak-
ings must be compensated."'"
2. Expectancies Inquiry
Neither the inquiry nor the relevance of public health and
safety concerns ended there. The Court turned to the question of
whether the State could resist compensation in one of these "cate-
gorical" liability cases. It reasoned, first, that liability could be
avoided in such a claim "only if the logically antecedent inquiry
into the nature of the owner's estate show[ed] that the proscribed
use interests were not part of his title to begin with."2 That is,
was the expectancy allegedly taken a part of plaintiff's compensa-
ble expectancies "to begin with"? Second, to determine whether
-1 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (holding that a prohibition on the manufacture and sale of
intoxicating liquors is not a compensable taking); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
" Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991) (relying
on a line of cases finding that a taking does not occur if the regulation prevents public
harm), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
" Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
"0 Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 (emphasis in original).




the estate included that interest, one would look to "background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already
placed upon land ownership."23 The Court remanded the case for
further proceedings and the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled
that a temporary taking had occurred. "4
B. A Near-Lucas Cluster
Much as the newborn stars of the Pleiades cluster, our con-
tinuing scan of the nighttime sky reveals for a mo-
ment-especially from the perspective of the expectancies in-
quiry-a selected cluster of recent decisions.
Glancing westward, we find two notable cases from Oregon.
The first predates Lucas but is important to reference because of
its role in the second (post-Lucas) of the two cases. In 1967, Ore-
gon enacted a comprehensive statute to regulate development and
use of the seashore and beaches within the state. 5 In a suit under
that act, the State sought to enjoin the owners of a tourist facility
from constructing fences or other improvements in the dry sand
area of the beach (an area between the sixteen-feet contour line
and the ordinary high tide line of the Pacific Ocean).2 6 In Oregon
ex rel. Thomas v. Hay, the Oregon court reached to the ancient
doctrine of "customary use" to establish the preexisting state in-
terest in assuring the use and enjoyment of the dry sand area.17
In the second case, Stevens v. City of Cannon Beach, the De-
partment of Parks and Recreation denied plaintiffs' request to
build a seawall adjacent to two vacant lots." The intermediate
appeals court turned to the "antecedent law" inquiry articulated
in Lucas and pointed to the doctrine of customary use summa-
rized in Hay to conclude that the plaintiffs never had a "property
interest" to construct the wall. 9
Now, looking northward along the East Coast, we see that a
1987 storm breached the beach off of a group of coastal proper-
ties. The storm exposed the coastline to higher tides and destruc-
1s Id. at 2900.
14 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 424 S.E.2d 484 (S.C. 1992).
"I OR. REv. STAT. §§ 390.065 to .925 (1991).
26 Oregon ex rel. Thornton v. Hay, 462 P.2d 671, 672 (Or. 1969).
Id. at 677-78.
' 835 P.2d 940 (Or. Ct. App. 1992), afd, 854 P.2d 449 (1993), petition for cert.
filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3275 (U.S. Sept. 27, 1993)(No. 93-496).
29 Id. at 942.
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tive wave action, posing a threat to the houses. The landowners
brought various administrative and court actions seeking permis-
sion to construct barriers to stem this enhanced erosion."0 Before
administrative action occurred, however, the wave action de-
stroyed the houses."1 Rejecting takings claims tied to the failure of
the agencies to act, the state court in Wilson v. Commonwealth
reasoned that Lucas would have little bearing. 2 The court read
Lucas as not involving administrative action, loss attributable to
natural resources, or, for that matter, allegedly dilatory conduct. 33
C. "Taking" a Turn into Regulatory Timber
1. Mining and Surface Mining
Still on the eastern horizon, we can see a light which reminds
us that mining was there at the beginning-when our walk into
this regulatory takings forest began.
For seventy years, our courts have explored just how far is
"too far" under the often quoted language from Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon: 4 "[Wlhile property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking.""5 The Nollan6 and Lucas37 tests are only the newest
stars placed by the Supreme Court in this regulatory nighttime
sky. In Mahon, the Court addressed the lawfulness of a Pennsyl-
vania act, which regulated subsurface mining of anthracite coal,
as an exercise of the police power. 8 Concluding that the statute
sought to benefit only one private house, Justice Holmes con-
cluded that the Act had effected a total preclusion of mining and
that the "public interest" associated with protecting one private
residence was insufficient to "warrant so extensive a destruction of
the [company's] constitutionally protected rights."39
In its own search for takings landmarks, the Court has twice
returned to coal mining. It did so, each time, in the context of
"0 Wilson v, Commonwealth, 597 N.E.2d 43, 44 (Mass. 1992).
31 Id.
" 597 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1992).
3 Id. at 46.
S4 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
18 Id. at 415.
31 See supra note 6.
31 See supra text accompanying notes 11-24.
31 Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 396-99.
" Mahon, 260 U.S. at 414.
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surface mining legislation. First the Court addressed the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 (SMCRA). 0
Through this Act the Congress saw the wisdom of regulating, in-
ter alia, steep slope mining so as to assure reclamation of mine
slopes to their original contours. 1 Elsewhere, Congress concluded
that surface mining should be prohibited outright "subject to valid
existing rights" in certain areas, such as national forests and na-
tional parks.4" Expectancies which could establish themselves as
"pre-existing," or valid existing rights (VERs), were exempted
from the prohibition. 8 The process of probing the contours and
status of these VERs continues through today. In the first of these
two cases, the Court concluded that the company had failed to
demonstrate that a facial taking resulted from mere enactment of
SMCRA's Section 522(e) provision."'
But it was the second case which, some sixty-five years after
Mahon, revisited the takings implications of surface mining regu-
lation in some detail. In the context of a facial taking challenge to
Pennsylvania's Bituminous Coal Act, the Court applied the three-
factor analysis in Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v.
DeBenedictis.4" On the character of the action inquiry, it con-
cluded that Pennsylvania's new legislation (unlike the Kohler Act
which Holmes had viewed as serving the interests of only one pri-
vate residence) served broad public and nuisance-like purposes. 46
Moreover, because the new Act only required companies to leave
a portion of their coal in the ground as pillars to avoid surface
subsidence, the Court could not conclude that mere enactment of
the legislation effected compensable interference.47 Finally, the
record failed to show interference with distinct investment-backed
expectations attributable to enactment of the legislation itself.4 8 In
4o 30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1328 (1986).
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b).
42 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e).
43 Id.
44 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296 (1980)
(finding that a mere diminution in property value resulting from the legislation's express
terms was not compensable). Moreover, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit later advised that it was premature to raise a claim under Section 522(e) until the
VER administrative process had been exhausted. See Burlington N. R.R. v. United States,
752 F.2d 627 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
45 480 U.S. 470, 485-93 (1987).
46 id.
"7 Id. at 493-97.
48 Id.
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contrast to Mahon, the Court sustained the State's exercise of po-
lice power (this time) and proceeded to find that, on its face, the
new statute did not go too far."'
The Pennsylvania courts are apparently not finished exploring
takings and surface mining. In Gardner v. Commonwealth, plain-
tiffs had acquired their interests (some of which had already been
mined) as devisees to a 1968 will.50 In 1967, the later devised
property was already subject to Pennsylvania's Bituminous Coal
Open Pit Mining Conservation Act.5' It lay within Pennsylvania's
Moraine State Park and, in 1971, Pennsylvania's Surface Mining
Conservation and Reclamation Act52 operated to permit surface
mining in public parks by way of variance.53 Although that statute
was amended in 1980 to prohibit surface mining except where at-
tributable to "existing rights,"' " the Act retained the Secretary's
authority to grant variances for mining in state parks in "special
circumstances." The state court resolved the taking claim by turn-
ing to the ripeness doctrine. 55 "Landowners bear the burden of
showing that no administrative remedy exists or that none is ap-
plicable in this case." 6 The State need not demonstrate conclu-
sively that "a variance might be granted, but merely that a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statutes and regulations admits to the
possibility of an administrative remedy."5 The "special circum-
stances" option afforded just such a possibility.
Indiana has also recently addressed surface mining and tak-
ings. Under the authority of the Indiana Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, 8 the State had designated a 6.57 acre par-
cel as "unsuitable" for surface mining.59 The designation rested
on the existence of a significant archaeological site on the land. 0
49 Id.
50 603 A.2d 279 (Pa. Commw. 1992).
" 52 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 1396.1 to .21 (1966).
In 1971, the Pennsylvania Bituminous Coal Open Pit Mining Conservation Act was
amended and retitled the Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act.
52 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1396.4b(c) (1966).
52 PA. STAT. ANN, § 1396.4(e) (1966).
Gardner v. Commonwealth, 603 A.2d 279, 282 (citing Williamson County Planning
Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).
56 Id. at 282-83.
57 Id. at 283.
56 IND. CODE § 13-4.1 (Burns 1990).
* Department of Natural Resources v. Indiana Coal Council, 542 N.E.2d 1000,




Despite the designation, the State allowed for continued farming
use and for subsurface mining, provided that the archaeological
objects remained undisturbed." Further, in the event the owner
would permit archaeological testing and data collection (at no cost
to the owner), the restrictions would thereafter be lifted.6" The
Indiana Supreme Court found no taking.6
In the facts of one suit which remains pending, a different
result followed. The Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act prohibits surface mining which would interrupt, discontinue,
or preclude farming on alluvial valley floors (AVFs).1" In Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit concluded that Congress intended that the
provisions of SMCRA would directly apply to-and pro-
hibit-mining of plaintiff's coal6 5 Moreover, it affirmed the trial
court ruling that the provision deprived Whitney of "all economi-
cally viable use" of its property.6 The circuit dismissed govern-
ment arguments that a residual use (farming) existed and that the
economic impact of the prohibition had been mitigated (a refer-
ence to the statute's provisions for an exchange of regulated
coal). 67 Finally, the circuit rejected the proposition that the gov-
ernment's action fell within the "nuisance exception" in this
case. 6
8
Before leaving the mining terrain, our attention is drawn to
quarry operations, mill tailings, and uranium mining leases. Here,
we first notice New Jersey. In Bernardsville Quarry, Inc. v. Bor-
ough of Bernardsville, the plaintiff had purchased a quarry in
1987 which had been in operation since 1931.69 The quarry had
been declared a nonconforming use in 1963, and at that time, the
previous owner agreed to a mining depth limitation."' The plaintiff
initially mined under two temporary certificates of occupancy; the
a' Id.
12 Id. at 1002.
03 Id. at 1007.
" 30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5)(A) (1988).
" 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991). Several federal
takings decisions addressed in this article, including Whitney and others later mentioned,
remain pending in the federal courts. Given the pendency of those cases, the discussions
here will be limited. See infra notes 118-28, 159-69 and accompanying text
6 Id. at 1174-77.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1177.
6- 608 A.2d 1377 (N.J. 1992).
70 Id. at 1379.
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second certificate, however, was suspended when engineers discov-
ered asbestos material at the site. 1 In 1988, the plaintiff filed for
an application to mine and excavate down to levels below the ear-
lier stipulated floor." The Borough denied the application, and the
plaintiff alleged a taking."'
In its opinion, the state court looked at the Nollan "nexus"
inquiry, 4 concluding that reasonable bases existed for the munici-
pality to conclude that the quarrying operations were a threat to
the environment (e.g., the potential for surface pollution, ground-
water pollution, and asbestos risks)." The court then turned to the
economic diminution inquiry, citing Gardner v. New Jersey Pine-
lands Commission"' for the New Jersey rule that no regulatory
taking occurs unless the action denies "all practical use" or fails
to allow "adequate" or "just and reasonable return."" In
Bernardsville Quarry, remaining uses included blacktop or con-
crete production, revenues from telephone tower location, plus of-
fice complex and residential use. 78 Focusing on the third factor,
the court reasoned that the plaintiff had no reasonable expectation
at the time of its acquisition to quarry ten million metric tons
"without being subject to significant governmental restrictions. '79
Moreover, citing Lucas, the court concluded that reasonable ex-
pectations should countenance the possibility of some change in
restrictions.8"
Turning our eyes westward again, we find a case involving
the Secretary of the Interior's approval, consistent with his statu-
tory role as Trustee, of leases to mine uranium located on Navajo
Tribe trust lands.81 Responding to the Tribe's subsequent concerns
over the lease return, the Secretary deferred approval of the pro-
71 Id.
72 Id.
" Id. at 1379-80.
See supra note 6.
71 Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1383-86 (citing Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987)).
76 593 A.2d 251, 260 (N.J. 1991).
7' Bernardsville Quarry, 608 A.2d at 1382.
71 Id. at 1387.
70 Id.
66 Id. ("It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the use of his prop-
erty to be restricted, from time to time, by various measures newly enacted by the State in
legitimate exercise of its police power." Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S.
Ct. 2886, 2899 (1992)).
" United Nuclear Corp. v. United States, 912 F.2d 1432 (Fed. Cir. 1990), reh'g de-
nied, No. 89-1727, 1990 U.S. App. LEXIS 21056 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 3, 1990).
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posed mining plan.82 In time, the lease lapsed and the lessee sued
for a taking. Relying on a three-factor test, the court in United
Nuclear Corp. v. United States focused on economic impact and
reasonable investment-backed expectations, evidenced by the cor-
poration's investment of $5 million in the lease development.83 In
the particular circumstances of this case, the court rejected the
conclusion that plaintiff lessee's reasonable expectations had been
colored by the Secretary's trust duties. 84 Further, it rejected the
conclusion that the Secretary's action fell within the Mugler line
of cases.
85
Finally, we turn to the question of royalty readjustments on
coal mined from federal lands. In Western Energy Co. v. United
States Department of the Interior,"8 the plaintiff challenged the
Interior's readjustment of royalties due under leases entered pur-
suant to the 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act (MLLA).87 West-
ern Energy alleged that the adjustment of royalty rates and the
reduction of periods at which royalty readjustment would occur
(from twenty to ten years) would effect takings of already existing
lease interests.88 Looking to the MLLA under which the original
expectancies had been created, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
Congress' intent was to leave the establishment of mineral rates to
administrative action and to allow for secretarial oversight and
subsequent amendment of the Secretary's authority. 89
2. Wetlands
As the snow covering the forest floor seems to thin, we move
from the rock and mineral-laden landscape into what we recognize
today as wetlands. The Clean Water Act seeks the restoration and
maintenance of the chemical, biological, and physical integrity of
the "waters of the United States."90 To that end, it precludes the
discharge of dredge or fill material into those waters but enables
the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the Corps) to issue
82 Id. at 1434.
91 Id. at 1435-37.
84 Id. at 1436.
15 Id. at 1438.
932 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1991).
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988).
Western Energy Co., 932 F.2d at 812.
I Id. at 813.
90 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1986).
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permits for discharge.91 By regulatory definition, "waters of the
United States" includes wetlands. 92 Similarly, wetlands have been
held to be "navigable waters" of the United States.98
In this area, we can begin to see a few themes. For instance,
the cases are arising in instances of denial of (or agency delay in
acting upon) the required permit for use of the private property.
Further, the economic impact and reasonable financial expectation
factors are forcing litigants to come to grips with the property's
dimensions as an "economic unit." This latter theme, which the
nomenclature terms "the parcel as a whole" issue, struggles to de-
fine the piece of property against which the severity of the regula-
tory impact will be measured. A given level of economic impact
has a different significance when measured against an overall unit
of twenty acres than when measured against a unit of, say, twelve
hundred acres.
We begin in 1979 in New Jersey. In American Dredging Co.
v. New Jersey, plaintiff's twenty-five-hundred-acre tract fronted
the Delaware River in Logan Township. " Under its existing zon-
ing, the tract was already limited to fifty percent development.95
Plaintiff contended that application of New Jersey's own wetlands
statute-which regulated only eighty acres of the entire tract and
which left open the opportunity for a permit-effected a taking.96
The court rejected the challenge, noting that the roughly three
percent of the parcel which was affected by the State's wetlands
statute could easily serve the purpose of the "open space" already
excepted by the property's existing zoning-resulting, even if per-
mitting was denied, in no additional impact." Moreover, the po-
tential for a permit did exist, holding open the possibility of some
development on the restricted property. 98
In American Savings & Loan Association v. County of Ma-
rin, we find the county treating a sixty-eight acre holding in two
different ways." On the one hand, it zoned twenty acres for high
The procedures governing the Corps' review are found in 33 C.F.R. §§ 320-330
(1991).
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(2), (3), (7).
13 Save Our Wetlands, Inc. v. Sands, 711 F.2d 634, 647 (5th Cir. 1983).
9- 404 A.2d 42 (1979).
95 Id. at 44.
" Id. at 43.
97 Id. at 44.
98 Id.
99 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
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density development. The remaining forty-eight-acre parcel, how-
ever, was zoned only for low density development.1 00 The Associa-
tion, arguing in part the rule for severance damages in condemna-
tion cases, contended that the segmentation of the combined tract
eroded its value and effected a taking.' 0 ' Pointing out that a sever-
ance damage theory presumes the answer to the very question
before the court-the extent of the "parcel as a whole"-the cir-
cuit looked to the following flexible criteria for identifying the cor-
rect parcel: physical contiguity, unity of ownership, and unity of
use.1"" Unless the developer could demonstrate the futility of do-
ing so, the court concluded that it could not answer the parcel as a
whole issue until the plaintiff submitted a development plan to the
county a103
We next briefly reference Fox v. Treasure Coast Regional
Planning Council, where the court concluded that a compromise
land use plan attempting to reconcile wetlands values with Fox's
proposed development lacked sufficient findings.' 04 Florida's stat-
ute provided that a governmental agency regulating development
could not issue an order which was unduly restrictive or which
constituted a taking. Construing that statute, the court stressed
that
the focus [was] on the nature and extent of the interference with
the landowner's rights in the parcel as a whole in determining
whether a taking of property has occurred. Prohibition of devel-
opment on certain portions of the tract [did] not in itself effect
an unconstitutional taking.10
In New Hampshire, Donna Rowe contended that denial of a
variance (from the Town of North Hampton's wetlands ordi-
nance) reduced the value of her property from $130,000 to a sub-
stantially smaller figure, resulting in a taking. 06 The state Su-
preme Court in Rowe v. Town of North Hampton affirmed the
lower court's finding that because significant wetlands legislation
existed at the time of Rowe's purchase, she had no justified expec-
100 Id. at 367.
101 Id. at 368.
102 Id. at 369.
103 Id. at 371.
' 442 So. 2d 221 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
100 Id. at 225 (emphasis added).
"o 553 A.2d 1331 (N.H. 1989).
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tation to be free of wetlands concerns.1"7 Further, Rowe's property
retained, by her own expert's testimony, economic value even if
the variance was denied. 08
We now turn to the federal sector. In 1981 the United States
Court of Claims (the predecessor of the United States Claims
Court and, more recently, the United States Court of Federal
Claims) addressed the Rivers and Harbors Act"09 and the Clean
Water Act in Deltona Corp. v. United States.110 In 1964, plaintiff
had purchased ten thousand acres, which were subdivided into five
development areas."' In that same year, a dredge and fill permit
issued; in 1969, after public interest review, a second permit is-
sued, albeit with some conditions. In 1973, three permits were re-
quested: one was granted (because work had progressed and sig-
nificant environmental damage had occurred), and two were
denied. " 2 The court concluded that the plaintiff had recovered
value from the overall property and, thus, had not been deprived
of all economic utility. 13
In the same year, the Court of Claims addressed another
Corps permit denial in Jentgen v. United States.114 There, the
Corps offered modifications which would allow development of
more than twenty of the eighty acres in contest." 5 The applicant
declined thai option. " ' The court found no taking, reasoning that
although plaintiff might have suffered some economic loss as a
result of the regulations, the impact was not such as to effect a
taking.11
7
Nine years later, in Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States,
the Corps of Engineers denied plaintiff a permit to develop twelve
and one-half acres of what was an otherwise developed two-hun-
dred-and-fifty-acre parcel." 8 The trial court elected to view the
applicable parcel as the smaller segment.1 9 Because eleven and
107 Id. at 1336.
106 Id.
10- 30 U.S.C. § 403 (1988).
11' 657 F.2d 1184 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
"I Id. at 1188.
"I Id. at 1188-89.
"' Id. at 1192-94.
657 F.2d 1210 (1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017 (1982).
I6 d. at 1212.
116 Id.
1"7 Id. at 1213-14.
118 21 C1. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
I'D Id. at 154.
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one-half acres of that segment were in fact regulated wetlands,
the permit denial-in the trial court's view-effectively deprived
the small parcel of its economic value. 2° The court found a tak-
ing, and the case is now pending before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 2'
In Florida Rock Industries v. United States, the landowner
had purchased property and received local zoning sufficient for
limestone mining activities prior to enactment of the Clean Water
Act provisions. 2 Mining did not commence until 1978, but in
1980 the Corps issued a letter directing Florida Rock to cease
mining activities pending completion of the permit process.
12 3
When the company applied for a permit to mine ninety-eight
acres, the EPA, the Fish and Wildlife Service, and the National
Park Service objected. The Corps denied the permit.12 4 Invoking
the three-factor analysis, the trial court found a taking. With re-
spect to the character of the action inquiry, the court concluded
that limestone mining was not properly viewable as a nuisance.1'"
The court then turned to the economic impact and expectations
inquiries, finding that no market existed among knowledgeable
buyers in holding the property for speculation. 2 ' Identifying a
diminution of ninety-five percent in value based on the valuation
evidence before it, the court found a taking." 7 This case is also
pending in the Federal Circuit. "
In Ciampitti v. United States, plaintiff purchased property in
1979 or early 1980 and at that time knew that some nearby lots
were wetlands within the terms of New Jersey's state wetlands
program (adopted in 1970)."' Indeed, his pattern of succeeding
purchases indicated that the property owner actually knew where
the wetlands were and was gerrymandering his purchase plan so
as to buy around the wetlands. 3 Finally, in September 1983, the
plaintiff purchased an additional forty-five acres (known as
12 Id. at 159.
121 21 CI. Ct. 153 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5050 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 15, 1991).
122 21 CI. Ct. 161 (1990), appeal docketed, No. 91-5156 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1991).
123 Id. at 164.
124 Id.
121 Id. at 166-67.
126 Id. at 172.
I d. at 176.
121 Id. at 161.
119 22 C1. Ct. 310 (1991).
120 Id. at 321.
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Purchase 7).131 The purchase price was $3.3 million, against a
mortgage obligation of $2.8 million.' 32 From commitments for
four ocean-side blocks in the purchase, the plaintiff expected to
return some $4.6 million on his investment. "'
About fourteen acres of Purchase 7 had been mapped as state
wetlands; an additional four acres were federally regulated wet-
lands. Those eighteen acres were the subject of the takings
claim.134 On two instances shortly before plaintiff's acquisition of
Purchase 7, the Corps advised Ciampitti to cease filling operations
already underway on the property."' On the date of purchase,
September 15, 1983, the Corps issued a cease and desist order.' 36
Ciampitti did not receive the order until October, but the court
concluded that he was fully informed of the likelihood that the
Corps would assert jurisdiction over the lands as of the date of
purchase."' Eventually, the United States was forced to secure a
district court temporary restraining order restricting further fill-
ing.' 31 When Ciampitti applied for an after-the-fact permit, the
permit was denied for two reasons. First, the project was inconsis-
tent with: federal wetlands regulations; title 33, section 320 of the
Code of Federal Regulations; the EPA's wetlands guidelines; and
(in New Jersey's view) the state's coastal zone management pro-
gram.' Second, Ciampitti had failed to seek required state wet-
lands permits. 40
In the resulting takings claim, the court did not view the nui-
sance issue as dispositive and turned to the economic impact and
reasonable expectation inquiries. "' In this context, it concluded
that the "parcel as a whole" included, at least, all of the estimated
forty-five acres in Purchase 7.11 Here, such factors as contiguity,
date of acquisition, treatment of the parcel as a single unit, and
the extent to which protected lands enhanced the value of the un-




"1 Id. at 315.
136 Id.
131 Id. at 316.
18 United States v. Ciampetti, 583 F. Supp. 483 (D. N.J. 1984).
138 Ciampitti v. United States, 22 C1. Ct. 310, 316 (1991).
140 Id.




protected lands informed the outcome. 4" Moreover, the portions
of Parcel 7 were treated as a whole for purposes of purchase and
finance.14" Given government evidence of $14 million in retained
value, no compensable economic impact had occurred. 14 Pointing
to Ciampitti's advance notice of the wetland character of the
lands, his apparent gerrymandering purchase practice, and his
(relatively speaking) little investment risk in Purchase 7 by virtue
of the value of the anticipated four block sales, the court con-
cluded that Ciampitti had no reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations in development of the wetlands lots.
146
We will now turn to two cases which combine the Section
404 wetlands taking inquiry with a further question. To do so, we
must lay a threshold. In First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church v. County of Los Angeles, the Supreme Court considered
whether it was a sufficient remedy (from the perspective of the
Takings Clause1 4 7) to provide for administrative rescission of gov-
ernment action later found to be a taking. 48 Was a "temporary"
or interim monetary remedy required for the period before rescis-
sion? Yes, the Court reasoned: "[W]here the government's activi-
ties have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subse-
quent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to
provide compensation for the period during which the taking was
effective."' 49 The Court made clear that it was not addressing in-
stances of "normal" governmental delay in decision making.1 50
In the following two federal cases, we see claims of such
"temporary" takings. In Dufau v. United States, the Corps issued
a 1984 cease and desist order against clearing and fill operations
and required an after-the-fact permit. "' The landowner applied
for the permit on November 13, 1984, and, on March 25, 1986,
after mitigation negotiations, a permit for fifty-seven acres is-
sued. "2 On November 6, 1986, Dufau applied for a permit to de-
velop thirteen acres which had been set aside as mitigation under
143 Id.
144 Id. at 319.
141 Id. at 320.
146 Id. at 320-21.
141 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
" Id. at 321.
100 Id. at 323.
' 22 CI. Ct. 156, 158-59 (1990), affd, 940 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
11' Id. at 159-60.
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the original permit. 15 3 Ten months later the second permit also
issued. Because permits eventually issued, Dufau could not prevail
on a permanent taking claim. 154 Turning to the temporary taking
inquiry, the court gauged the "delay" period as from the date of
application to permit issuance; in the case of the first permit, the
delay period was fifteen and one-half months. 55 This period of
time was not, in the court's view, unreasonable delay; indeed, ten
of those months were devoted to mitigation negotiations, and
plaintiff had indicated his own satisfaction with the process at that
time.' 56 Moreover, the period between the issuance of the cease
and desist order and the after-the-fact application was also not
cognizable; plaintiff was obligated to comply with the regulatory
process.'" 7 The court rejected plaintiff's claim that market deterio-
ration during this period was compensable. Without extraordinary
delay, the externally-driven market deterioration was
noncompensable.'"
Next, in Tabb Lakes, Inc. v. United States, we see a roughly
three-year period between the Corps' assertion of jurisdiction by a
cease and desist order over plaintiff's regulated wetlands and a
later district court ruling invalidating that order for procedural
reasons. 50 Plaintiff alleged that the defective assertion of jurisdic-
tion effected a temporary taking. 60
Within the context of the character of the action inquiry, the
court concluded that "'absent extraordinary delay' in the govern-
mental permitting or decision-making process, mere diminution in
value will not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of a taking."''
"The Corps' assertion of jurisdiction over the wetlands on plain-
tiff's property was based upon a good-faith belief that the wet-
lands were within its jurisdiction," notwithstanding the fact that
the district court later found the rationale for jurisdiction proce-
durally defective. 6 '
153 Id.
151 Id. at 162.
155 Id. at 163.
I" id. at 163-64.
"' United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 131-39, 164 (hold-
ing that the Clean Water Act authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to require landown-
ers to obtain permits from the Corps before discharging fill material into the wetlands).
158 Dufau, 22 CI. Ct. at 164 (citing Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n.9 (1980)).
150 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), appeal docketed, No. 93-5029 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 23, 1992).
I6 d. at 1343.
I' Id. at 1353.
1I2 Id. at 1354.
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The court's primary focus in Tabb Lakes, however, was on
economic impact. In that context, the court reached the parcel as
a whole inquiry and based its ruling on alternative grounds-the
first ground viewing the entire five-section development as the en-
tire parcel and the alternative ground viewing sections three, four,
and five as the parcel.1 8' Within the alleged period of the taking,
undisputed evidence showed gross sales of more than $3.9 mil-
lion. 164 In the court's judgment, that was more than sufficient to
demonstrate that plaintiff did not lose all economically viable use
of its property during that period. "
On the smaller parcel, the court viewed plaintiff's argument
as, essentially, the following:
Apparently, plaintiff theorizes that since a developer would not
buy all of the property in sections 3, 4, and 5-because [the
wetlands] could not be developed-plaintiff lost all economically
viable use. The standard plaintiff is arguing is not "all economi-
cally viable use," but rather some version of "economically via-
ble use of 'all' " in the same way that the term "all" appears to
have been used by [plaintiff's expert]. "
As the court put it rather succinctly: "The standard advocated
. ..is neither appropriate nor legally cognizable." 167 Moreover,
because the undisputed facts showed substantial economic activity
during the three-year period (e.g., $1.89 million in total receipts
on the three sections), plaintiff could not credibly claim that the
economic impact was only "one step short of complete" as envi-
sioned by Lucas itself. 68 The court found no temporary taking,
and the case was recently affirmed by the Federal Circuit. 6 '
3. Critters
Walking more quickly now, we nonetheless catch what seems
to be the image of deer out of the corners of our eyes.
163 Id. at 1346.
16, Id. at 1352.
"' Id.
" Id. at 1349-50.
167 Id. at 1350.
I" d. at 1352 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886,
2895 n.8 (1992)).
"'9 26 Cl. Ct. 1334 (1992), ard, 10 F.3d 796 (1993).
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In Southview Associates, Ltd. v. Bongartz,t7 ° the Second Cir-
cuit considered the takings implications of Vermont's 1970 "Act
250."'l' Requiring land use planning and a land use permit, the
Act had an "eye towards maintaining, among other things, ex-
isting recreational uses of the land, such as hunting, and preserv-
ing lands, when possible, that have special value to the public.' 172
In 1982, twelve years after passage of Act 250, Southview pur-
chased eighty-eight acres near Stratton and Jamaica, Vermont,
intending to construct a seventy-eight lot residential subdivision. 7 3
As a part of its own review of the project, Southview studied deer-
yard maps, prepared by the Vermont Department of Fish and
Wildlife, that showed a winter habitat for white-tailed deer and
found no indicated deeryards on the tract.' 7 ' Shortly before filing
its Act 250 application, however, Southview in fact identified a
deeryard presence.175 When the District III Environmental Com-
mission denied the permit, it found that the proposed development
was situated within a two-hundred-and-eighty-acre deeryard-the
only deeryard within a roughly eleven-square-mile area-that was
necessary for winter survival of the white-tailed deer. 7" Its find-
ings concluded that the construction would destroy one of the two
best cover areas within the yard and, without effective mitigation,
significant tree cover area.' 77 The Vermont Environmental Board,
on review, agreed with the Commission and found that the pro-
posed development would "destroy and significantly imperil" a
deeryard "decisive" to the deer. 7 8 The Vermont Supreme Court
eventually affirmed.' 79
Southview then brought an action on due process and takings
theories under the Civil Rights Act, 180 and the Second Circuit
170 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub nomn. 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993).
... VT. STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (1984 & Supp. 1991).
"' Southview Assoc., Ltd., 980 F.2d at 89.
17 Id.
171 Id. at 90.
176 Id.
1 I d. at 91.
177 Id.
1I Id. (referencing VT STAT ANN. tit. 10, § 6086(a)(8)(A) (1984)).
In re Southview Assoc., 569 A.2d 501, 505 (Utah 1989).
ISo 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). "Every person who, under color of any statute, ordi-
nance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proceeding for redress. ... Id.
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considered whether the district court appropriately dismissed the
action for failure to state a claim."' The Second Circuit found the
claim insufficient under physical taking theory because it lacked
either a government directed "absolute dispossession of
Southview's property rights' 182 or governmentally compelled occu-
pation of the property. 8 ' In its regulatory and due process analy-
ses, the court turned to the ripeness doctrine as enunciated in Wil-
liamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton
Bank. 84 Because Southview had submitted only one application
under Act 250 and because the Board might be receptive to a plan
which located development in a different segment of the parcel,
some development might be possible. That being so, the impact of
the state action was not yet "final."' 8 5 As further ground for the
unripeness of the takings claim, the Second Circuit rejected
Southview's argument that it need not pursue a claim for just
compensation first in the state courts. 86 Southview argued that
because Vermont had no statutory just compensation provision, it
necessarily had no state taking remedy.
87
As we gaze westward again, it is elk that we see. The moon-
light clears for a moment-it is tule elk. In Moerman v. State of
California, the plaintiffs contended that a state program to relo-
cate elk into their native ranges resulted in the presence of elk on
their two-hundred-acre ranch.188 State efforts to discourage the
elk were not completely successful.'8 9 Indeed, the State permitted
the hunting of the elk. 9 Plaintiffs alleged that the presence of the
elk effected a taking under physical liability theories.' 9 ' The court
disagreed, resting on the proposition that the State neither owned
nor controlled animals which had not been reduced to posses-
' Southview Assoc., Ltd. v. Bongartz, 980 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied sub
nom. 113 S. Ct. 1586 (1993).
112 Id. at 95 (citing Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419,
435 n.12 (1982) (noting that not every physical invasion will constitute a taking)).
' Id. (citing Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992)).
184 473 U.S. 172 (1985) (pointing to the need for a "final" state position impacting
the proposed use and, for the taking claim, the utilization of a state just compensation
remedy if available).
"I8 Southview Assoc., Ltd., 980 F.2d at 97.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 100.
21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329 (Cal. App. I Dist. 1993).
'89 Id. at 331.
190 Id.
19 Id. at 332.
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sion.' 92 It was not enough that the elk had been once captured or
that they were now the objects of a state management plan. The
court declined to reach allegations that a regulatory taking had
occurred.
19 3
And, northward, toward Lake Michigan, we see the night-
time commercial fishing of smelt. The purpose is to avoid inciden-
tal catches of the protected alewife fish. The Wisconsin court in
LeClair v. Natural Resources Board concluded that this regula-
tion of fishing under Wisconsin-issued permits did not effect a tak-
ing of those commercial permits."" Pointing to Board of Regents
v. Roth, 95 the court reasoned that compensable expectancies are
"something more" than "unilateral expectations."" Nothing in
the statutes or rules creating the permitting structure "grant[ed]
any 'entitlement' to forage fishing licenses, or to indefinite contin-
uation of the fish quotas and time and area restrictions contained
in existing permits."' 97 Although government action may create
valuable benefits, the government frequently-as the court rea-
soned had occurred here-reserves the power to modify or limit
those expectancies. When such changes later occur, no taking of
an "entitlement" results. 98
4. CERCLA
Our walk continues, pausing only briefly to catch the flicker
of a CERCLA-related case. In Hendler v. United States, the EPA
attempted to combat the spread of ground water contamination to
plaintiff's property and to other adjacent sites from a toxic waste
site known as the Stringfellow Acid Pits. 9 9 Acting under the au-
thority of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compen-
sation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 200 the EPA drilled ground
water wells and installed corresponding monitoring equipment at
12 Id. at 333-34.
I3 ld. at 335 (distinguishing Yee, 112 S. Ct. 1522, where the Supreme Court initially
agreed to consider a regulatory taking argument even though it was unclear whether the
argument had been raised in the lower courts).
.94 483 N.W.2d 278 (1992).
19 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972).
199 LeClair, 483 N.W.2d at 282.
1 7 Id. at 283.
198 Id.
199 952 F.2d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
... 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1982).
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three sites on plaintiff's property.201 Plaintiff claimed that this
presence effected a taking. 2 Before the case could be adjudicated
on the merits at the trial level, plaintiff failed to comply with dis-
covery and suffered a dismissal.2 0' On review, the circuit reversed
the dismissal.2 04 In fact, within the limits of the record then before
it, the court found a physical taking205 and remanded for further
proceedings.' 0
5. Rails-to-Trails
As we turn to our next heading, we discover a trail which
apparently was, at one time, a railroad track bed. To be precise, in
Preseault v. United States""7 the plaintiff challenged the 1988
amendment to the National Trails System Act.'" 8 Through the
amendment, Congress sought to assure that otherwise abandona-
ble railroad rights of way were maintained in the interest of fu-
ture rail revitalization. 09 Congress, thus, empowered the Inter-
state Commerce Commission (ICC), through its long-standing
discontinuance and abandonment powers, to "railbank" such
rights of way and to allow for the interim discontinuance of ser-
vice. 10 During the interim, the right of way could be applied to
trail use."' In part focusing on the plaintiffs date of purchase
(after enactment of 1976 federal legislation providing for the con-
cept of railbanking), the trial court found that plaintiff had no
compensable expectancy to be free of the railbanking and trail use
provision." 2
II. THE TRIP CONCLUDES
With that trail, our present trek ends. It is clear enough that
there are some other stars about to emerge overhead. For the mo-
001 Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1370.
202 Id.
200 Hendler v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 27 (1989).
oo, Hendler, 952 F.2d at 1382-83 (finding an abuse of discretion because failure to
comply with the court order was not due to willfulness or to bad faith).
10 Id. at 1377.
20 Id. at 1384.
... 27 Fed. Cl. 69 (1992).
.08 16 U.S.C. §§ 1242-1251 (1988).
"I8 Preseault, 27 Fed. Cl. at 80.
-10 Id.
21 Id.
211 Id. at 94.
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ment, though, we must pause. During our course, we have moved
from the concept of a "categorical" regulatory taking, in the rela-
tively rare instance of a loss of all economic value, to the three-
factor analysis, which balances the character of the government's
action, its economic impact, and its interference with investment-
backed expectations, to assess whether compensable interference
has occurred. We have noted Nollan. Moreover, we have seen how
an analysis of the "antecedent" expectancies (including such in-
quiries as customary use and public trust) in the property is
clearly critical in today's regulatory taking claim. From the per-
spective of gauging economic impact, we have glimpsed the com-
plexity of proof on the "parcel as a whole" issue. And, from the
vantage point of the temporary taking theory, we have seen that
reasonable-even if apparently procedurally-flawed-government
actions have been held not to give rise to takings. Along the way,
we have focused on mining and mineral takings claims, wetlands
suits, species protection, CERCLA activities, and the rails-to-
trails program. This overview is only a portion of the environmen-
tal program forest, and much more terrain remains to be crossed.
For those who focus on the litigation of such claims, we can-
not close without stressing one further point. It is absolutely essen-
tial to understand the complexity of this particular forest. The
regulatory takings case is among the most complicated-legally
and factually-on the federal or state docket. Factual proof on
such issues as the extent of economic impact and reasonable ex-
pectations requires an exhaustive analysis of the current use of the
property and the justifiability of the use allegedly taken. Typi-
cally, this proof is expert-based and can be expensive. On the
other hand, and of equal significance, it is patently clear from the
journey just completed that the legal standards which guide us on
the takings trek are themselves evolving. The result is a lawsuit
which, subject to the client's interests and goals, calls out for the
best in conscious case management. It should be said again: It is
complicated litigation. It is, however, plainly invigorating-just
like that nighttime walk in a winter's forest.
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